Analysis of Partnership Pattern, Benefits, and Transaction Costs Between Partners and Toko Tani Indonesia Center in adang City (Case Study of UD Yaser Arafat)

Rahmatullah, Syukri (2026) Analysis of Partnership Pattern, Benefits, and Transaction Costs Between Partners and Toko Tani Indonesia Center in adang City (Case Study of UD Yaser Arafat). S1 thesis, Universitas Andalas.

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the partnership patterns, distribution of tangible and intangible benefits, and transaction cost structures within the Toko Tani Indonesia Center (TTIC) program in Padang City. Drawing on New Institutional Economics (NIE), particularly the transaction cost perspective, this study employed a qualitative case study approach, with primary data collected through interviews with key informants. The findings indicate that the institutional mechanism operates under an imperfect general trading arrangement. The partnership has not developed a fully integrated agricultural supply chain, but continues to depend on institutional and administrative arrangements inherited from previous government programs such as LDPM and PUPM. Furthermore, the study identifies an asymmetric distribution of benefits among partners. Tangible economic benefits, including regular product procurement and favorable price margins, are primarily received by the active partner. In contrast, passive partners receive limited direct economic benefits but tend to maintain their formal participation in the program because of potential intangible benefits, particularly expectations of access to future government assistance. Finally, the analysis suggests that partner inactivity can be understood as a rational response to relatively high transaction costs. Bureaucratic constraints within the TTIC increase institutional uncertainty and contribute to higher decision and coordination costs. These constraints are compounded by a delayed payment mechanism (tunda bayar) that ties up approximately IDR 10–15 million in operational capital, creating additional financial burdens for participating partners. Given the availability of alternative buyers in the open market offering immediate cash payments, some partners prefer to discontinue supplying products through the TTIC

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