

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion

This research shows that the reliance of Russia on the Wagner Group cannot merely be understood as a means of responding to short-term military requirements. It reflects deep-seated elements of Russian strategic culture that resonate with its leaders. First, Russian invasion and insecurity have long contributed to such a worldview, as war is an inevitable part of the international environment.

This perspective encourages a readiness that is perpetual and justifies indirect or deniable use of force as a regular practice of statecraft. Second, Russia views international relations through a zero-sum prism, viewing world politics as a competition for influence instead of a partnership. Wagner's actions in Africa, the Middle East and Ukraine also reflect this way of looking at the world: by making it possible for Moscow to broaden its influence while limiting what Western nations can do. Third, the Russian political culture values the exercise of power with great legitimacy. Military might is perceived as evidence of sovereignty, of prestige. Wagner works in this environment, implementing the *de facto* use of coercion into a flexible and politically secure foreign policy.

Together, they account for why the Kremlin institutionalized a private military company in its foreign-policy arsenal. Wagner is no aberration, but instead a

contemporary manifestation of the Russian strategic culture's legacy, a fusion of historical insecurity, competitive rationale and assurance in the power of force that has become a single, iterative tool.

5.2 Recommendation

Future studies can expand this analysis by comparing Russia's experience with other states that use private military companies as extensions of national strategy. In practice, understanding the cultural and strategic roots of Wagner's operations can help policymakers anticipate how similar groups might be employed in future conflicts, especially in grey-zone environments.